Contextualizing Beijing’s Futuristic Economic Designs through BRI and CPEC to Enhance Its Diplo-Economic Influence and Role of Pakistan
Dr. Hasan Yaser Malik （ Charted Institute of Logistics and transportation (UK), 3/4 Earlstrees Court, Earlstrees Road, Corby, Northants, NN17 4AX, United Kingdom ）
https://doi.org/10.37155/2972-4813-gep0303-2简介
China and Pakistan are enjoying friendly relations since the inception of People’s Republic of China in 1949; however relations reached the pinnacles once Pakistan backed diplomatic relations between People’s Republic of China and the U.S, which eventually lead to People’s Republic of China Permanent membership in UN in 1971 instead of Republic of China. Since, bilateral relations have been improving between China and Pakistan in including diplomatic, economic and military domains. Karakoram Highway has proved to be a unique masterpiece and legacy of trust between the two. The establishment and progress of China Pakistan Economic Corridor as a harbinger of Chinese Belt Road Initiative has proved to be yet another legacy. However this time, the Chinese emerging diplo-economic global power has become an eye sour for a few extra regional powers like U.S and its Western Allies, who are leaving no stone unturned to diminish the ever increasing regional and extra regional influence of China since 2017 particularly in geo-political domains of maritime affairs. China Pakistan Economic Corridor ever since 2013 is no exception to such efforts as any damage to it will not only affect the Chinese global prestige but can also upset the trust between the two. Hence it will be imperative to understand the possible challenges with a view to prepare and manage a timely response to any such efforts up till 2030.
关键字
China; Pakistan; Relations; Challenges; Maritime domain; Diplo-Economic; Response and leverages全文
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版权所有 © 2025 Dr. Hasan Yaser Malik
出版时间:2025-07-28
本作品采用以下许可协议授权： 知识共享 署名 4.0 国际许可协议
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